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AN ENTRENCHED BILL OF RIGHTS:A PROTECTION 
FOR THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 
KENNETH J ARENSON* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper is concerned with the question of whether Australia 
would be better served by the inclusion of an entrenched Bill of 
Rights in the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia. In 
particular, attention will focus on the abuses of minorities that are 
all but certain to arise in any society that is based on majoritarian 
rule. This paper will also examine the question of whether an 
entrenched Bill of Rights would serve as an effective safeguard 
against such abuses, especially where the rights of unpopular 
minorities are involved. The analysis to follow is undertaken 
against the backdrop of the efficacy, or the lack thereof, of the 
Constitution of the United States in preventing such abuses, and 
particularly that portion of the American Constitution that is 
known as the Bill of Rights. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In 2008 the Rudd Government established a National Human Rights 
Consultation for the purpose of determining how best to protect human 
rights and freedoms in Australia. However, this seemingly wide ambit 
was constrained in one fundamental way: 'the Government has made it 
clear that any proposal must preserve the sovereignty of Parliament'. 1 
The terms of reference made it clear that any new laws in this area' shall 
not be based on the United States Bill of Rights' and that any options 
put forward by the Committee should not include a constitutionally 
entrenched Bill of Rights. 2 
2 
Associate Professor, Deakin University, School of Law; BA, University of 
Kentucky; 10, University of Toledo; LL.M, University of Edinburgh. The 
author wishes to thank both Nathan Hinde and Nadine Courmadias for their 
excellent research contributions to this piece. 
'Rudd Government announces National Human Rights Consultation', 10 
December 128/2008 Attorney-General, Robert McClelland, Parliament 
House, Canberra ACT 2600. 
Australian Labor Party National Platform and Constitution, April 2007, 
Chapter Thirteen 'Respecting Human Rights and a Fair Go for All'. This 
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In April 2010, the Attorney-General, the Hon Robert McClelland 
MP, launched the Government's response to the National Human 
Rights Consultation Committee's report: Australia's Human Rights 
Framework.3 The Framework is based on Australia's commitment 
to human rights obligations, human rights education, domestic and 
international engagement on human rights issues, improvement in 
human rights protections and greater respect for human rights within the 
community.4 The goal to improve human rights protection is expressed 
to include greater judicial scrutiny. 
These are laudable goals, but the actions that are designed to address 
them are far from adequate. 5 One of the key recommendations (the 
enactment of a national Human Rights Act) was supported by more 
than 87% of the 35,000 public submissions, but not adopted by the 
government. 6 The Australian Human Rights Commission publicly 
expressed its disappointment that this recommendation was not 
implemented and encouraged the government to revisit this as part of 
its review of the Framework in 2014.7 
This author urges the government, whether as part of its 2014 Framework 
review or otherwise, to call for submissions on an entrenched Bill of 
Rights and give the submissions its utmost attention. To ignore this issue 
or, as was the case with the 2008 Consultation, exclude it from the terms 
of reference, would be most unfortunate and represent another missed 
4 
6 
7 
is not to suggest that the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia 
is completely devoid of protection of civil liberties. See, for examples, 
ss 51 (xxxi), 80 and 116 which guarantee the right of trial by jury for 
Commonwealth indictable offences, compulsory acquisition of property 
on just terms and the separation of church and state respectively. 
Attorney-General Robert McClelland, Australia s Human Rights 
Framework (21 April 2010) Attorney-General's Department <http://www. 
ag.gov.aulhumanrightsframework>. 
Ibid. 
Education initiatives; a new Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights to review legislation for compliance with international human rights 
obligations; making a statement of compatibility with international human 
rights obligations for new bills; combining federal anti-discrimination laws 
into a single Act; and holding an annual Human Rights Forum. 
ABC, 'The Drum', Human Rights Framework: Icing Without the Cake, 22 
April 20 I 0 (Philip Lynch) <www.abc.net.aulunleashedl33766.html> 
Australian Human Rights Commission, 'Important steps to better 
protect human rights but substantial gaps remain' (Media Release, 21 
April 2010). 
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opportunity. An entrenched Bill of Rights is worthy of reconsideration, 
especially for the adequate protection of minorities. 
In addressing this long-standing issue, debated since before federation, 
it is appropriate to begin by ascertaining what central objective is 
sought to be achieved by an entrenched Bill of Rights. Attention will 
then focus on whether this objective is legitimate and, if so, to what 
extent Australia can adequately achieve it without an entrenched 
Bill of Rights. 
II WHAT IS THE CENTRAL OBJECTIVE IN HAVING AN 
ENTRENCHED BILL OF RIGHTS? 
In this context, 'entrenched' denotes a body of law which is supreme 
not only in the sense that it has an overriding effect on other law, but 
supreme in the sense that it cannot be altered or repealed through the 
ordinary legislative process.8 Rather, it can only be altered through an 
arduous process that is designed to make it resistant to the temporal 
whims of the electorate, as by amendment requiring ratification by public 
referendum and/or a super majority of states or the nationallegislature.9 
8 Colin Munro, Studies In Constitutional Law (Butterworths, 2nd edn, 1999). 
It should be emphasised that there are numerous statutory schemes now 
extant in Australia which accord federal protection to human rights. Just to 
cite some of numerous examples, see Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); 
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth); Disability Discrimination Act 1992 
(Cth); Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth). For similar statutory protections 
provided by the states and territories, see Charter on Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic); Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW); 
Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld); 
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA); Anti-
Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas); Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT); the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic), the 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA), 
the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 
(Tas), the Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) and the Anti-Discrimination Act 
1992 (NT) (none are entrenched). 
9 For example, United States Constitution art V; Grundgesetz flir die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany], art 144; La constitution du 4 octobre 1958 [French Constitution 
of 4 October 1958] art 89; The Constitution of the Republic of Italy, 
art 138. 
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In many modem democracies, entrenched rights are part and parcel 
of. written constitutions which are themselves entrenched in the 
manner described. An entrenched Bill of Rights in the Australian 
context, therefore, is one that would be adopted by amendment to the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia. Chapter VIII of the 
Australian Constitution outlines the requirements for its amendment. 
Any amendment (such as the introduction of a constitutional Bill of 
Rights) would require an absolute majority in both houses of the Federal 
Parliament and, by referendum, the agreement of a majority of electors 
(nationally) and a majority of electors in a majority of states. 10 An 
entrenched Bill of Rights in Australia would be a constitutional rather 
than a statutory one. II 
To define the term 'entrenched' is also to illuminate the basic objective 
in having an entrenched Bill of Rights; namely, to express society's 
judgment that certain rights are too important to make their continued 
existence dependent upon the will ofa simple majority of the electorate. 12 
It has been said, with justification, that Australians are wary of 
constitutionally entrenched rights. 13 This observation is exemplified in 
the fact that two attempts to amend the Australian Constitution so as to 
include rights protection have failed. 14 Further, in Australia the rights of 
the majority have generally been well protected without an entrenched 
Bill of Rights. IS Nevertheless, it is contended that an entrenched Bill 
of Rights is necessary for the protection of minorities. Under certain 
circumstances, the rights of minori ties must take precedence over the right 
of the electorate to impose its will in the form of ordinary legislation,16 
and this requires an entrenched rather than a statutory Bill of Rights. 
10 The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia ('Australian 
Constitution ,), s 128. 
II The latter has been recommended by the National Human Rights Committee, 
Recommendation 18. 
12 Munro, above n 9. 
13 Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), Protecting 
Rights Without A Bill of Rights: Institutional Performance and Reform in 
Australia (Ashgate, 2006) 3 (,Protecting Rights') 
14 1944 Referendum and 1988 Referendum to the Australian Constitution 
IS Protecting Rights, above n 14. 
16 Jonathan D Varat, William Cohen and Vikram David Amar, Constitutional 
Law, Cases and Materials (Foundation Press, 10th ed, 2009), 18 
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Constitutions typically entrust the responsibility of constitutional 
interpretation to an independent judiciary that is free from electoral 
accountability.17 The end result is that any action which conflicts with 
the constitution, be it executive, legislative, or otherwise, is null and 
void unless and until the constitution is amended in the aforementioned 
manner. 18 In common parlance, and for purposes of the discussion to 
follow, the power of the judiciary to invalidate such acts will be referred 
to as the power of judicial review. 
The perceived advantages of judicial review (carried out by an 
independent judiciary that is free from electoral accountability) are 
oftentimes seen as disadvantages; that is, it is said that judicial review 
of legislation is inherently undemocratic because it not only permits the 
nullification of legislation, but reflects the will of unelected judges. 19 
However, in the case of judicial review of legislation (or another Act) 
that conflicts with the constitution, the nullification is in fact the will 
of the people as expressed in the supreme law of the land. From this 
perspective an entrenched Bill of Rights and judicial review comport 
well with the tenets of democracy; 'the judges do not check the 
people, the Constitution does, which means the people are ultimately 
checking themselves'. 20 
III IS THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES A 
LEGITIMATE OBJECTIVE? 
If the central objective of an entrenched Bill of Rights is to protect 
minorities, a preliminary question arises: is the protection of minorities 
a legitimate objective? For those who would answer in the negative, 
the argument is as follows: no form of government is legitimate unless 
it is democratic and, further, democracy denotes government by the 
people or majoritarian rule. It follows, therefore, that to the extent that 
protection of minority interests is anti-majoritarian, it is undemocratic 
and illegitimate. 
17 Michael Louis Corrado, Comparative Constitutional Law: Cases and 
Materials (Carolina Academic Press, 2005). 
18 Roger Douglas, Douglas and Jones's Administrative Law (Federation 
Press, 5th edn, 2006). 
19 Brian Boynton 'Democracy and Distrust after Twenty Years: Ely's Process 
Theory and Constitutional law from 1990 to 2000' (2000) 53(2) Stanford 
Law Review 397 
20 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard University Press, 1980), 
p 8. 
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It should be noted that most dictionaries define 'democracy' in spacious 
teRnS that do not lend themselves to precision. While 'democracy ' is 
usually defined as 'government by the people' ,21 the divergent forms of 
government in France, Italy, Germany, Canada and the United States, 
all generally recognised as democratic, illustrate the fact that there is 
no universally accepted concept of democracy.22 Moreover, the term 
'majoritarian' has varying connotations of its own. In its purist sense, 
the term can be taken to mean that the will of the majority governs. 
Yet in practical terms, how could such a system ever be implemented? 
To ensure that all governmental actions conform to the will of a 
majority of the electorate, it would be necessary to submit all issues 
to the electorate in the form of a public referendum or some analogous 
technique. Such a practice would not only be onerous and impractical, 
but would strip elected representatives of conscience and independence 
in making decisions. In any event, suffice it to say that majoritarian 
government in its purist form is non-existent in the modem world. What 
is extant is a pragmatic form of majoritarian government whereby laws 
are enacted and enforced by elected officials who are accountable to 
their respective constituencies.23 Electoral accountability, however, 
by no means ensures that elected officials will carry out the wishes 
of a majority of their constituents. Rather, it ensures that if they fail 
to do so, a day will eventually come when they may be voted out of 
office and replaced by others who mayor may not prove to be equally 
disappointing. Moreover, the very fact that elected officials are often 
voted out of office demonstrates that pragmatic majoritarian government 
is far removed from majoritarianism in its purist form. 
In a similar vein, it is highly impractical to expect an elected official 
to act in accordance with a majority of his or her constituents on every 
occasion. It is common knowledge, that the re-election of incumbents is 
more often the rule than the exception. This is an indication that elected 
representatives are judged on their entire records and not on the notion 
21 David B Magleby, Paul C Light, J W Peltason, Clay Robison and Thomas 
E Cronin, Government by the People (Prentice Hall, 2007); United States 
Constitution, art VI, s 2. 
22 Laza Kekic 'The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy' 
(2007) The World in 2007, The Economist. 
23 David S Lee, Enrico Moretti and Matthew J Butler 'Are Politicians 
Accountable to Voters? Evidence from U.S. House Roll Call Voting 
Records' (Working Paper No 50, Center for Labor Economics University 
of California Berkeley, March 2002). 
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-------------------------------
that they are always expected to follow the wishes of their constituents. 
It is therefore apparent that whatever the professed commitment of 
most modem societies to the notion of majoritarian rule, it is less than 
a total commitment. This point is buttressed by the fact that all of the 
aforementioned nations have adopted the concept of an entrenched 
Bill of Rights as an integral component of their systems of democracy. 
Therefore, unless one is prepared to argue that true democracy does not 
exist in the modem world, the fact that the protection of minorities may 
be anti-majoritarian does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that it 
is undemocratic and, therefore, illegitimate. Reaching this conclusion, 
however, is not the sole factor which affords legitimacy to the objective 
of protecting minorities from the abuses that can be associated 
with majoritarian rule. 
In further exploring this issue, it is helpful to examine the legitimacy, or 
lack thereof, of the notion ofmajoritarian rule. In truth, there is nothing 
sacrosanct in the concept of 'government by the people'. Rather, it is 
simply a pragmatic means of ensuring, at least theoretically, that those 
who are disaffected with society's rules will be in the minority. Since a 
minority can and often does constitute nearly half of the population, it 
is fair to say that majoritarian rule is an ineffective means of achieving 
total peace and harmony among the electorate. 
Second, just as the notion of majoritarian rule was spawned from 
considerations of pragmatism, so too was the notion that certain 
principles are too important to make their continued existence 
dependent upon the will of a majority of the electorate. In particular, 
this notion emanates from a recognition that majoritarian rule poses 
a risk that the rights of minorities will be abused. It requires little 
imagination to appreciate that what is popular is not necessarily just. In 
any representative system of government, therefore, there lies the risk 
that minorities who are weak, unpopular, or effectively disenfranchised 
may lose fundamental protections that are not vouchsafed by some 
form of law which is resistant to the temporal whims of the electorate. 
Thus, the necessity for an anti-majoritarian body of law to protect the 
rights of minorities becomes apparent. Since the notions ofmajoritarian 
rule and the need for a supreme law to protect minority interests both 
derive from considerations of pragmatism, there is no apparent reason 
why the former should be viewed as any more legitimate than the latter. 
This, coupled with the fact that most modem societies deem both to be 
essential components of democracy, affords legitimacy to the objective 
of protecting the rights of minorities. 
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IV CAN AUSTRALIA ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE 
RIGHTS OF MINORITIES WITHOUT AN 
ENTRENCHED BILL OF RIGHTS? 
35 
Australia's system of government reflects both British and North 
American influences. One such influence is the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty: the Parliament can pass, amend, or repeal any law it 
wishes and no person or body is recognised as having the authority 
to amend, repeal or override an act of Parliament.24 By definition, 
therefore, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty precludes the 
existence of an entrenched Bill of Rights and the power of judicial 
review. 25 On the other hand, Australia has a written constitution (in part 
based on the United States Constitution). The Australian Constitution 
is the supreme law in Australia and ultimate sovereignty resides in 
the Australian people.26 
Some would argue that judicial review in the Australian system affords a 
certain measure of protection to minorities. The argument follows that as 
a body of non-elected members who are essentially appointed for life,27 
the judiciary can operate with the requisite degree of independence from 
political pressures. This, it may be argued, serves as an important check 
on the potential abuses of majoritarian rule. Although this argument is 
not entirely bereft of merit, the judiciary can only provide assistance by 
overturning actions it interprets to be inconsistent with existing laws. In 
such situations the legislature can amend the legislation if desired. The 
exception to this is where the legislation is deemed unconstitutional; 
however, the Australian Constitution does not include a Bill of Rights. 
It follows, therefore, that the judiciary is not a particularly effective 
24 Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke (1969] 1 AC 645, 723 (Lord Reid); 
R (Jackson and Others) v Attorney General [2006] 1 AC 262, (Lord 
Carswell). 
25 The position has been somewhat modified in the United Kingdom. See 
Church of Scotland Act 1921 (UK); European Communities Act 1972 (UK); 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
26 Geoffrey Lindell 'Why is Australia's Constitution Binding? - The Reasons 
in 1900 and Now, and the Effect oflndependence' (1986) 16 Federal Law 
Review 29, 37; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth 
of Australia (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138; Theophanous v Herald & Weekly 
Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171; Wong v Commonwealth of Australia 
(2009) 236 CLR 573, 596. 
27 Federal Court of Australia Act (Cth) 1976, s 6; Australian 
Constitution s 72. 
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form of protection for the rights of minorities from majoritarian rule 
without an entrenched Bill of Rights in Australia. 
Another common argument is that Australia's status as a signatory to 
international human rights instruments is sufficient to protect the rights 
of minorities. Australia has committed to give effect to the human rights 
obligations in a number of international human rights instruments, 
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(lCCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
Analysis reveals, however, that there are both technical and practical 
reasons why it is not sufficient to adequately protect the rights of 
minorities. First, even if Australia is a signatory to an international 
instrument, the requirements in the instrument will only be effective in 
Australia when and to the extent that they are incorporated into national 
legislation. The mere fact that Australia has agreed internationally to 
certain obligations is no guarantee that our legislation already meets 
those standards or that it definitely will. Unlike the ICCPR, for example, 
the ICESCR has not been scheduled to or declared under the Australian 
Human Rights Commission Act. International instruments rarely have 
any real enforcement mechanism. Second, the international instruments 
themselves usually include an escape clause. For example, Article 4 of 
the ICCPR allows its obligations to be derogated 'in times of public 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation' provided that such 
measures do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, 
colour, sex, language, religion or social origin'.28 
Finally, the efficacy of these international human rights instruments in 
safeguarding human rights in Australia is simply this: there is nothing 
to prevent Parliament from invoking its sovereignty to withdraw from 
these instruments altogether, although it is important to note that such 
a statement fails to take into account both customary international law 
as well as the fact that the ICCPR is devoid of any mechanism for 
denouncing the Convention. Therefore, it is apparent that Australia's 
status as a signatory to the international human rights instruments, 
28 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), 
art 4.There are, however, certain obligations that are non-derogable under 
Article 4 of the ICCPR. 
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while commendable and appropriate, is not an adequate substitute for 
in~orporating an entrenched Bill of Rights into its domestic law. 
The argument that minorities in Australia are adequately protected under 
present law might also be predicated on the view (formulated by Dicey) 
that adherence to the rule of law is, by itself, sufficient to safeguard 
individuals from arbitrary governmental action. 29 By rule of law, 
Dicey was referring to more than merely the common law and acts of 
Parliament; rather, the rule oflaw consists of three separate components. 
Although Dicey's theories were formulated in the British context, they 
are relevant in Australia. First, Dicey's rule oflaw denotes the absolute 
supremacy or predominance of ordinary law as distinguished from 
the influence of arbitrary power; it therefore excludes the existence of 
wide discretionary powers, prerogatives and arbitrariness on the part 
of government.30 Second, the rule of law envisages equality before 
the law of all classes as administered by the ordinary courts of law. 
This excludes the notion of exemptions for public officials and others 
from obedience to the laws that govern ordinary citizens or from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of ordinary jurisdiction.31 Lastly, the rule oflaw 
denotes a formula for expressing the fact that in Britain, a constitution 
is not the source of individual rights, but the consequence of the same 
as defined and enforced by the courts. In Australia, therefore, according 
to Dicey's argument, individual rights are secured by judicial decisions 
developing the common law and construing acts of Parliament in 
cases before them.32 
Though adherence to Dicey's formulation of the rule of law would 
afford a substantial measure of protection for the rights of minorities, it 
should be pointed out that Dicey did not take issue with the fact that acts 
of Parliament displace common law rules where such is the intent of 
Parliament. To be sure, Dicey was one of the leading proponents of the 
view that parliamentary sovereignty, by definition, places no restrictions 
on the power of Parliament to pass whatever legislation it deems proper. 33 
Dicey therefore rejected the familiar arguments that this power could 
be limited by so called entrenched provisions in Britain's Treaties of 
29 Albert V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 
(Liberty Fund, 8th ed, 1982), pp 183-205. 
30 Ibid 187-188: at 202. 
31 Ibid 93: at 202. 
32 Ibid 195-196: at 203. 
33 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56 [9]. 
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Union or by 'manner and form' restrictions contained in prior acts of 
Parliament.34 What is more, Ristory has thus far supported Dicey's 
view.35 Dicey did, however, recognise certain non-legal restrictions 
on parliamentary sovereignty: the fact that members of Parliament are 
ordinarily people of conscience and sound mind who would be loath 
to impose evil laws on the population and the possibility, presumably 
in the minds of Ministers of Parliament, that the electorate would not 
obey such laws.36 The likelihood of this state of existence occurring in 
Britain or in Australia cannot be relied upon. Therefore, despite Dicey's 
idealistic concept of the rule of law, most notably its prohibitions on 
arbitrary governmental action and inequality before the law, the reality 
is that the enforcement of these prohibitions is solely dependent upon 
the grace of Parliament in the exercise of its sovereignty. 
There is also the question of the Australian government's lack of 
accountability for disregarding the law. Although the Attorneys-General 
are theoretically responsible for enforcing the law and investigating 
alleged transgressions, including those involving government officials, 
it is also a fact that he or she is a member of the Cabinet who, on the 
advice of the Prime Minister, serves at the pleasure of the Governor-
General.37 Therefore, notwithstanding the duty of the Attorneys-
General to act impartially, there is, at the very least, a perception that his 
or her impartiality may be compromised when it comes to investigating 
allegations of corruption on the part of government officials.38 This 
perception is exacerbated by the fact that commissions are virtually 
powerless to overcome the government's resistance to their efforts to 
obtain witnesses and other evidence needed to investigate allegations 
of corruption within the government.39 In short, since the government 
is normally in control of Parliament, it can stifle practically any 
investigation it wishes. 
In addition, comment must be made of Dicey's view of the common 
law as a fundamental source of protection for certain political rights 
34 W Ivor Jennings The Law and the Constitution (University of London 
Press, 1933). 
35 Ibid 
36 Joaquin Varela Suanzes, 'Sovereignty in British Legal Doctrine' (1999) 6.3 
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law September, [62]. 
37 lana McCarthy 'The Evolution of the Role of the Attorney-General' (2004) 
11.4 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law. 
38 Ibid. 
39 G Zellick, Government Beyond Law (Public Law, 1985). 
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such as freedom of speech, association, and personalliberty.40 Dicey's 
view is difficult to sustain in Australia, particularly in modem times. 
First, while the common law has been of some utility in protecting 
certain political rights such as freedom of speech, association, and 
personal liberty,41 it has provided little protection for social and 
economic rights. In the area of social rights, for example, it was only 
in exceptional circumstances that the common law provided protection 
for the rights of racial minorities.42 In the economic sphere, benefits 
such as welfare and other forms of social security are governed entirely 
by statute. Second, the courts are aware that Australia is a signatory 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, so it may be 
argued that there is less of an incentive for the courts to be innovative 
in developing the common law as a source of protection. Lastly, things 
have changed considerably since Dicey's commentary on the rule of 
law at the tum of the Twentieth Century. Since then, Parliament has 
opted to legislate on most matters rather than rely on the courts to deal 
with problems by developing common law rules. As a result, it would 
be reasonable to infer that the courts are probably less inclined to view 
themselves as major guarantors of human rights; rather, they are more 
inclined to see Parliament as the major guarantor with the courts merely 
providing assistance by giving effect to its legislation.43 Therefore, we 
return to our familiar theme that in reality, the protection of human 
rights is dependent upon the tender mercies of the various Parliaments 
whose adherence to the rule of law has been far from exemplary. 
The question that remains, therefore, is what this portends for the 
protection of minorities. 
40 Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional & Administrative Law (Routledge, 8th ed, 
2011), p 76. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Constantine v The Imperial Hotels Ltd (1944) KB 693 (holding that an 
innkeeper had committed a common law tort by refusing accommodations 
to a traveller on account of race; the court held that this was not a legal 
justification for the refusal); Scala Ballroom Ltd v Ratcliffe (1958) 3 All 
ER 220 (holding that a union had acted lawfully in attempting to persuade 
its members to refuse to perform at a place of business that excluded black 
patrons; the court held that this was a legitimate means for the union to 
protect the interests of its black members). 
43 W Finnie, Chris Himsworth & Neil Walker (eds), Edinburgh Essays in 
Public Law (Edinburgh University Press, 1991). 
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V PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS, SEXUAL AND 
RACIA1:, MINORITIES 
The Establishment Clause ofthe First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution is more than a form of protection for religious freedom; it is 
a symbolic expression of tolerance for the views of religious minorities 
and even those who profess no religious beliefs.44 Indeed, many of the 
settlers who first came to America did so in order to escape the bondage 
of laws which compelled them to support state sponsored reiigion.45 
Unfortunately, these same practices eventually took root on American 
soil,46 particularly in Virginia where the established church's excesses 
finally culminated in the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty.47 This bill 
provided that: 
... no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious 
worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, 
restrained, molested or burdened, in his body or goods, nor 
shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or 
belief.48 
The United States Supreme Court has declared that the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment was intended to serve the same 
objectives as the Virginia statute; namely, to prevent government 
intrusion on religious liberty.49 In Everson v Board of Education, 50 the 
Court expounded on the meaning of the Establishment Clause: 
The "establishment of religion" clause ... means at least this: 
neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. 
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
prefer one religion over another. .. No person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs .... 51 
Particularly appropriate to this discussion is the Supreme Court's 
decision in Lee v Weisman. 52 In that case, the Court held that a 
44 United States Constitution, amend I provides in pertinent part: 'Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion'. 
45 Everson v Board of Education, 330 US I, 8-10 (1947). 
46 Ibid 8-10. 
47 Ibid 10. 
48 Ibid 13. 
49 Ibid 14. 
50 Ibid 8-10. 
51 Ibid 16. 
52 505 US 577 (1992). See also Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe 
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state cannot, consistent with the Establishment Clause, control the 
content of non-sectarian prayers in its public schools. In reaching its 
decision, the Court reaffirmed this as the 'cornerstone principle'53 of 
the Establishment Clause as originally enunciated in Engle v Vitale. 54 
The following passage from Justice Black's opinion in Engle accurately 
represents the view adopted by the Court in both cases: 
The Establishment Clause ... does not depend on any showing of 
direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment 
of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws 
operate directly to coerce non observing individuals or not. 
This is not to say, of course, that laws prescribing a particular 
form of religious worship do not involve coercion of such 
individuals. When the power, prestige and financial support of 
the government is placed behind a particular religious belief, an 
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform 
to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.55 
It is against this background and reasoning that the protection of 
religious minorities in Australia will be evaluated. 
Australia's predilection for favouring the rights of the religious 
majority is also reflected in its anti discrimination laws. In particular, 
the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth) provide a comprehensive scheme of protection against 
most forms of racial and sexual discrimination. 56 Although the 
Racial Discrimination Act prohibits both direct and indirect forms of 
discrimination on account of race, colour, descent or ethnic or national 
origin, the Act is conspicuously silent on the matter of discrimination 
based on religion. In a nation which is predominantly Christian, 
who stands to lose the most from such an omission? The answer 
is self-evident. 
(2000) 530 US 290. While this case dealt with the issue of student led 
prayer, the Court reaffirmed the reasoning of Lee v Weisman by holding that 
any prayer that may be seen as endorsed by a public school is inconsistent 
with the Establishment Clause 
53 Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577, 587 (1992). 
54 Engle, v Vitale 370 US 421 (1962) ('Engle'). 
55 Ibid 430-431. 
56 It is noteworthy that the relevant conventions are devoid of any reference to 
anti-discrimination that is predicated on religious beliefs or the lack thereof. 
Although the ICCPR includes religion as a basis for non- discrimination, 
Australia had not ratified that Convention at the time the Commonwealth 
passed the Racial Discrimination Act. 
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The aforementioned gap in Australia's anti-discrimination laws is a 
classical illustration of the abuse that can be associated with majoritarian 
rule. Though Parliament can certainly exercise its prerogative to enact 
remedial legislation, whether it does so will depend on several factors, 
including the apparent level of public support for such action. Given 
the severe time constraints under which it operates, Parliament can only 
consider a fraction of the total number of legislative proposals during 
any given legislative session. 57 Therefore, unless there is endemic public 
support for a particular proposal, it is unlikely to find its way onto the 
government's legislative agenda. 58 It is always possible, of course, that 
a proposal could be introduced in the form of a private member's bill. 59 
The fact remains, however, that the success of private member's bills 
depends not only on obtaining a sponsoring Minister of Parliament, but 
on the government's cooperation in securing its passage.6D Although 
votes on private member's bills are theoretically non-partisan,61 the 
reality is that a government supported by a majority in the House of 
Representatives can usually impose its will on any legislative matter. 62 
Where the rights of minorities are concerned, particularly unpopular 
minorities, the chances of generating the necessary public support for 
protective legislation are remote. Therefore, the impetus for remedial 
legislation must come from within the ranks of Parliament itself. Given 
the possible political consequences of championing unpopular causes 
and the time constraints under which Parliament operates, it appears 
equally unlikely that protective legislation would rank as a high priority 
among members of Parliament. Indeed, if representative government is 
to fulfil the true meaning of its creed, its actions should reflect the will 
of the majority. When the will of the majority offends minority rights 
that are considered basic in a free society, the protection of minorities 
rests in the willingness of elected representatives to defy the wishes 
of their constituents. Though there are times when Parliament will 
follow what many consider to be the noble path of defiance, at other 
57 Bilika H Simamba, The Legislative Process: A Handbook for Public 
Officials (Author House, 2009). 
58 Julian Fitzgerald, Lobbying in Australia: you can't expect anything to 
change if you don't speak up (Rosenberg Publishing, 2006). 
59 Matthew Groves and H P Lee, Australian administrative law:fundamentals, 
principles and doctrines (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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times it will follow the path of political expediency. Perhaps the Racial 
Discrimination Act is an example of the former. Even so, Parliament's 
failure to act in the sphere of religious discrimination serves as a 
reminder that the protection of minorities cannot be made to depend on 
the willingness of Parliament to defy the tenets of majoritarian rule; it 
also serves to illustrate once again that the rule of 'government according 
to law' is of limited utility in safeguarding human rights. Indeed, some 
of the most flagrant abuses of human rights can be clothed with legal 
authority in a nation where Parliament is supreme and the cabinet is 
supported by a majority in the House ofRepresentatives.63 
With an entrenched Bill of Rights, the rights of minorities need not 
depend on such factors as the time constraints imposed on Parliament 
or its willingness to accord conscience a higher priority than political 
expedience. A Bill of Rights typically consists of general guiding 
principles that are capable of being adapted to provide solutions for 
a wide range of disputes. 64 It is this adaptability that affords a vital 
source of protection for minorities as new and unforeseen disputes 
arise.6s While there is little question that such adaptability is susceptible 
to judicial abuse, it may be the only effective and practical means of 
safeguarding those transcendent values which society regards as basic 
human rights; that is, it allows minorities the opportunity to persuade 
a non-elected and independent judiciary that their rights are already 
protected as opposed to forcing them to rely on the legislature to 
enact protective legislation.66 
A case example from the United States provides a useful illustration 
for this situation. 
In Rogers v Lodge, 67 several black citizens brought suit against various 
county officials in the State of Georgia alleging that the county's 'at 
large' election scheme violated their rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged 
that the 'at large' scheme was being deliberately maintained for the 
invidious purpose of diluting the voting power of black citizens. In this 
case, the elected offices at issue were the five seats on the Burke County 
63 A W Bradley, K D Ewing and E C S Wade, Constitutional and administrative 
law (Prentice Hall, 12th ed, 1997), p 99. 
64 Michael Zander, A Bill a/Rights? (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed,1997), 38 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 458 US 613 (1982). 
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Board of Commissioners which governed the county. Although 38% 
of the registered voters in Burke County were black, no black had ever 
been elected to the Board. 
The election scheme under attack required each candidate to run for 
a specific seat on the Board. In order to be elected, a candidate had to 
receive a majority of votes cast in the general election. If no candidate 
received a majority, a runoff was held between the two candidates who 
received the highest number of votes. In addition, voters were only 
permitted to vote once for any particular candidate. Since the voting 
in these elections went strictly along racial lines, the result was that no 
blacks were ever elected. 
Although the 'at large' system was racially neutral on its face, the 
Supreme Court held that a law having a disproportionate impact on 
an identifiable group will be treated as having created a classification 
along those lines if it is conceived or being maintained for a 
discriminatory purpose. Finding that this particular scheme was being 
maintained for such a purpose, the Court held it violative of the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
Rogers v Lodge68 is a particularly illuminating example of the dangers 
of majoritarian rule. When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 
1868,69 it is doubtful that the framers contemplated that the southern 
states would maintain superficially neutral 'at large' voting schemes 
to deliberately discriminate against black voters and candidates. 
Although the Supreme Court invalidated these laws, it did so via a 
constitutional rule that was not developed until more than a hundred 
years after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. 70 Had it not been 
for an entrenched right to equal protection of the law couched in broad 
and adaptable terms, the plight of black voters and candidates in Burke 
County, Georgia, would have rested on the willingness of Congress to 
enact protective legislation. 
This case illustrates that majorities are not only prone to trample on 
the rights of minorities, but the lengths to which they are willing to 
68 Ibid. 
69 United States Constitution amend XlV. 
70 Washington v Davis, 426 US 229 (1976) (,Washington ') (holding that 
enactments having a disproportionate impact on an identifiable group, 
coupled with a discriminatory intent, create classifications as to those upon 
whom the adverse impact is felt) . For a recent affirmation, see Vieth v 
lubelirer, 541 US 267, 333-34 (2004). 
COIlI'flght of FuU r..t ...... lS .... th the onglnal o,.ne, ~n<I. ucept~. pwmltted under thl Copofflght Act 1961, ~ln9 tPII. cop.,nght millelia ll. pto!>lblted without th" IM'm lnlon of the o .. ner Ot 
~I or bv .. w of . Ikence from Co!7r,lgllt,o,oency Umlted. For InformilUon .bout """ tanee •• COrltM.i tM Copyfigllt l<QeOCV Umitedon (02) 93947600 (pII) or {OIl 939047601 (fUI 
A Protection/or the Rights 0/ Minorities 45 
go to circumvent laws that are specifically designed to prevent such 
abuses. It was only the existence of a supreme law and the power of 
judicial review which prevented these efforts from reaching fruition. 
An entrenched Bill of Rights consisting of broad guiding principles is 
often indispensible to the protection of minorities. 
VI FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE 
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 
In the laws relating to freedom of expression, both Australia and the 
United States have long recognised that certain governmental interests 
justify restrictions on speech activity.71 While such interests must be of 
sufficient magnitude to outweigh the value of free expression,72 it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to furnish a finite list of governmental 
interests which meet this criterion. There is much insight to be gained, 
however, by an examination of the basic rationale underlying the right 
of free expression. Although there has yet to be a universally accepted 
statement of this rationale, an often quoted passage from Justice Holmes' 
dissenting opinion in Abrams v United States73 is most instructive: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly 
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power 
and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally 
express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To 
allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the 
speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the 
circle, or that you do not care whole heartedly for the result, or 
that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when 
men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, 
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundation of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired 
is better reached by free trade and ideas and that the best test 
of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market... It is an experiment, as all life is 
an experiment... While that experiment is part of our system ... 
we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the 
expression of opinions that we loathe ... Only the emergency that 
makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil 
71 Washington, 426 US 229 (1976) 500, 526. 
72 J Beatson, Yvonne Cripps and David G T Williams, Freedom 0/ expression 
andfreedom o/information: essays in honour o/Sir David Williams (Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
73 250 US 616 (1919) ('Abrams '). 
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counsels to time warrants making an exception to the sweeping 
command, "Congress shqll make no law... abridging the 
freedom of speech".74 
The more recent case of Virginia v Black, 75 is typical of similar decisions 
that have followed Abrams. 76 In that instance, the Court held a Virginia 
statute restricting 'cross burning' to be unconstitutional on the tenet 
that the act itself 'may mean only that the person is engaged in core 
political speech'. With reference to the above and like passages, it was 
found that the State could only limit 'cross burning' to situations where 
an intention to intimidate could be proven. The fact that 'cross burning' 
was 'distasteful'77 to the majority did not constitute a sufficient reason 
to forbid the act entirely. 
Consonant with this reasoning, Australia and the United States have 
imposed restrictions on speech which serve overriding government 
objectives such as the prevention of violence, 78 protection of consumers 
from false or misleading advertising,79 and protecting persons from 
74 Ibid 630-631. 
75 538 US 343 (2003). See also McConnell v Federal Electoral Commission, 
540 US 93 (2003). 
76 250 US 616 (1919). 
77 Virginia v Black, 538 US 343, 358 (2003). 
78 In Australia, see Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). In the United States, 
see Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942) (,Chaplinsky') 
(upholding a conviction under a statute that was construed as prohibiting 
face to face words having a natural tendency to provoke violence: the 
'fighting words' doctrine). For recent discussion of this case and it's 
'fighting words' test, see Virginia v Black, 538 US 343, 358-359 (2003). 
See also State of Nebraska v Drahota, 280 Neb. 627 (2010). Although 
discussion in the latter case is yet to be tested in the United States Supreme 
Court, it does, however, provide interesting detail on the continued weight 
of Chaplinsky s authority in American jurisprudence. 
79 In Australia, Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), sch 2, s 18 
(Australian Consumer Law). In the United States, see Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corporation v Public Service Commission, 447 US 557 
(1980) (the Supreme Court conceded that the interest in preventing false or 
misleading advertising was sufficient to justifY regulations on expression). 
For recent affirmation of this proposition and discussion of instances where 
it will be constitutionally valid to impose restrictions on false or misleading 
advertising, see Thompson v Western States Medical Center, 535 US 357, 
367 (2002). 
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unwanted intrusions into their personal privacy. 80 Equally consonant with 
Jm;tice Holmes' passage, at least in so far as American jurisprudence is 
concerned, is the cardinal precept that the government may not impinge 
upon expression solely on the basis of its disagreement with the particular 
content views expressed.81 Thus, restrictions on expression may not be 
justified solely on the ground that they are highly unpopular. 
As noted earlier, the theory of freedom of expression assumes the 
electorate's ability to make sound decisions when exposed to the free 
marketplace of ideas. In the United States where this theory is enforced 
through an entrenched provision in the Bill of Rights, this assumption 
has generally proved to be correct. Highly unpopular organisations 
such as the Ku Klux Klan and the American Nazi Party, for example, 
have been in existence for decades. Despite the continual exercise of 
their First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and association, the 
overwhelming majority of the American electorate has rejected their 
ideas and neither organisation has made significant political inroads. 
There is every reason to believe that Australians are equally capable 
of exercising sound judgment when exposed to the free marketplace 
of competing ideas. It seems most unlikely that a nation so profoundly 
committed to government by the people would accept the notion that 
its electorate is incapable of distinguishing between ideas that are well 
reasoned and those which are not. If that is true, then there is absolutely 
no justification for curtailing the expression of ideas solely on the basis 
of their unpopularity with a majority of the electorate. If one agrees 
with this reasoning, it is difficult to dispute the utility of an entrenched 
Bill of Rights in protecting the rights of minorities in Australia. 
On the other hand, Dicey stressed that a Bill of Rights comprised of 
broad statements of principle will be oflittle or no utility in safeguarding 
human rights without an effective enforcement apparatus. 82 In France, 
for example, private citizens have no right to challenge laws under the 
80 In Australia, see Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). In the United States, see Hill v 
Colorado, 530 US 703 (2000) (upholding a State law prohibiting a person 
from deliberately approaching another person in the immediate vicinity 
of health care centres without the prior consent of that person). See also 
general discussion in Rowan v Postmaster General, 397 US 728 (1970) for 
background on this proposition. 
81 Keith Werhan, Freedom of Speech: a reference guide to the United States 
Constitution (Praeger Publishers, 2004). 
82 Dicey, above n 30,198-199. 
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French Constitution. 83 Rather, it is only the government which has the 
authority to raise constitutional challenges and this can only be done 
before a law has become effective.84 In democracies such as the United 
States and Germany, however, any person claiming a constitutional 
deprivation has a right to raise his or her grievance in a court of 
law.85 Presumably, the same would be true in an Australian system of 
democracy which opted to incorporate an entrenched Bill of Rights into 
its domestic law. In countries where adequate means exist to enforce 
entrenched guarantees, the effect is to place the enforcement power and 
initiative in the hands of those who need it the most: the alleged victims 
of constitutional violations. Where there are no entrenched rights and 
the power of the legislature is supreme, those who have the power 
and primary initiative in safeguarding the rights of minorities may not 
always be responsive to the needs of minorities' . 
VII WHY MIGHT AUSTRALIA NOT WANT AN 
ENTRENCHED BILL OF RIGHTS? 
Opponents of an entrenched Bill of Rights could point to the 
discrimination against persons of Japanese descent in America during 
World War II (see below).86 The argument is that the entrenched right to 
equal protection of the law was ineffective to combat the public hysteria 
and mob mentality that led to such an injustice. Therefore, the argument 
follows, entrenched rights are really nothing more than a mirage if they 
can be ignored at a time when they are most needed. This argument 
is certainly worthy of a response, for it strikes at the very core of the 
notion that an entrenched Bill of Rights is the only effective means of 
safeguarding the rights of minorities. 
The right to equal protection of the law, however, does not require 
that the government treat all people alike in all circumstances. What 
it does require is that any disparate treatment must be non-arbitrary 
and supported by reasonable justification. When people are treated 
83 Walter Cairns and Robert McKeon, Introduction to French law (Cavendish 
Publishing, 1995) 10 1 
84 Ibid. 
85 David P Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(University of Chicago Press, 1994); Daniel A Farber and Suzanna Sherry, 
Judgment calls: principle and politics in constitutional law (Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
86 Robert S Hirschfield, The Constitution and the Court: the development of 
the basic law through judicial interpretation (Random House, 1962). 
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differently on account of race, as in the case of Japanese-Americans 
during World War II, the government's action can only be sustained 
if it is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest which 
cannot be achieved through less restrictive means. In two Supreme 
Court decisions in which the disparate treatment ofJapanese-Americans 
was challenged on equal protection grounds, the Court held that the 
government had met these criteria.87 In the case of Korematsu v United 
States,88 for example, Justice Black wrote: 
Legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial 
group are immediately suspect... courts must subject them to the 
most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes 
justifY the existence of such regulations: racial antagonism 
never can ... Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area 
because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because 
we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly 
constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West 
Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, 
because they decided that all citizens of Japanese Ancestry be 
segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because 
Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our 
military leaders as inevitably it must, determined that they should 
have the power to do this. There was evidence of disloyalty on 
the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need 
for action was great, and time was short. We cannot by availing 
ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight now say at that 
time that their actions were unjustified [emphasis added]. 89 
Despite what we may now think of the treatment of this group of people 
with our benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to find fault with the Court's 
reasoning. Therefore, it is hardly justifiable to assert that the right 
to equal protection of the law was subordinated to the whim of mob 
mentality at a time when it was severely tested. Whether one agrees 
with the finding in Korematsu90 or not, if the measures taken against 
Japanese-Americans occurred despite the existence of an entrenched 
Bill of Rights in the United States, one can only imagine the type of 
treatment that could have resulted without it. Viewed in this way, this 
87 Hirabayashi v United States, 320 US 8l (1943) (upholding a conviction for 
a violation of a curfew order). 
88 323 US 214 (1944) ( 'Korematsu ') (upholding a conviction for violating an 
exclusion order). 
89 Ibid 223. 
90 323 US 214 (1944) 
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example serves to confirm the need of an entrenched Bill of Rights. 
In any event, the argument that an entrenched rights cannot withstand 
severe political pressure is belied by innumerable instances in which the 
American courts have protected the constitutional rights of unpopular 
minorities. American courts, for example, have upheld the right to bum 
the American flag in public,91 the right to insist that any official prayer 
be banned from public schools,92 and the right of members of the Ku 
Klux Klan to express their views in pUblic.93 A particularly illuminating 
example of the advocacy of a Bill of Rights in protecting the rights of 
unpopular minorities occurred recently in the case of Snyder v Phelps.94 
In that instance the Westboro Baptist Church and its members were sued 
by the father of a dead American serviceman for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (lIED), intrusion upon seclusion and civil conspiracy 
arising from a protest that was held at his son's funeral. During the 
protest, members displayed offensive signs condemning acceptance 
of homosexuality in the armed forces, expressing thanks for the death 
of American soldiers and other provocative topics. The United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland initially found for Snyder. 
The decision was overturned, however, by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, after which it was brought before the 
Supreme Court of the United States by certiorari. In writing for the 
Court, Roberts CJ, with whom seven other Justices concurred, opined 
that the First Amendment could only provide protection to Westboro 
if the content of the disputed speech was of a public, as opposed to a 
private concern.95 In holding that the speech was protected by the First 
Amendment, Roberts CJ wrote: 
The "content" of Westboro's signs plainly relates to broad 
issues of interest to society 'at large', rather than matters of 
"purely private concern." Dun & Bradstreet, supra, at 759, 105 
S.Ct. 2939.The placards read "God Hates the USA/Thank God 
for 9111," "America is Doomed," "Don't Pray for the USA," 
"Thank God for IEDs," "Fag Troops," "Semper Fi Fags," "God 
91 Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397 (1989). See Virginia v Black, 538 US 343, 
358 (2003) for recent affirmation of this proposition. 
92 Engle, 370 US 421 (1962); Abington School District v Schempp, 374 US 
203 (1963); Westside Community Board of Education v Mergens, 496 US 
226 (1990). 
93 Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969). For recent discussion of this case 
see Virginia v Black, 538 US 343, 366 (2003). 
94 131 S.Ct 1207 (2011) ('Phelps'). 
95 Ibid 1215. 
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Hates Fags," "Maryland Taliban," "Fags Doom Nations," "Not 
Blessed Just Cursed," "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "Pope in 
Hell," "Priests Rape Boys," "You're Going to Hell," and "God 
Hates You." App. 3781-3787. While these messages may fall 
short of refined social or political commentary, the issues they 
highlight-the political and moral conduct of the United States and 
its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, 
and scandals involving the Catholic clergy-are matters of public 
import. The signs certainly convey Westboro's position on those 
issues, in a manner designed, unlike the private speech in Dun & 
Bradstreet, to reach as broad a public audience as possible. And 
even if a few of the signs-such as "You're Going to Hell" and 
"God Hates You"-were viewed as containing messages related 
to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders specifically, that would not 
change the fact that the overall thrust and dominant theme of 
Westboro's demonstration spoke to broader public issues.96 
51 
Snyder v Phelps is perhaps the most poignant example of an instance 
in which a Bill of Rights has been required to protect the rights of 
unpopular minorities. In addressing this issue and acknowledging the 
plight of Snyder and his family, Roberts CJ emphatically stated: 
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move people to 
tears of both joy and sorrow, and-as it did here-inflict great pain. 
On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing 
the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course- to 
protect even the hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we 
do not stifle public debate.97 
Those who oppose an entrenched Bill of Rights could also argue that 
such a concept is so alien to the Australian credos that the judiciary 
would be incapable of making the adjustment. Specifically, one could 
argue that judges who have been trained under a system so strongly 
influenced by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty would be so 
conservative in their interpretation of a Bill of Rights that its utility 
in safeguarding human rights would be severely emasculated. The 
response to this argument is two-fold: first, the argument is based on 
an assumption which has yet to be tested; and secondly, even if this 
assumption were correct, there is no reason to assume that a new 
generation of Australian lawyers would be similarly disposed to such a 
grudging approach to a Bill of Rights. 
96 Phelps, 131 S.Ct 1207(2011) 1216-1217. 
97 Ibid 1220. 
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VIn THE JUDICIARY 
Under the American Constitution, the President is entrusted with the 
power to appoint judges to the Supreme Court of the United States and 
the United States Courts of Appeal for the various circuits.98 Moreover, 
in every presidential campaign in the past sixty years, a major issue has 
arisen as to the type of judges that should be appointed to the federal 
bench.99 Without question, this has been a most divisive issue with 
various factions of the American electorate in presidential elections. 
Since presidents are elected by a national constituency, it is only natural 
that they have attempted to appoint judges who share their philosophy 
on the role of the judiciary in constitutional adjudication. lOo Therefore, 
judicial appointments tend to reflect the mood of the American electorate 
at that particular time. 
On the other hand, in the United States, federal judges are appointed 
for life lol and, therefore, the extent to which any President is able to 
influence the orientation of the judiciary will depend on several factors, 
including the number of vacancies that accrue during his or her term 
in office. Presidents Nixon and Reagan, for example, appointed four 
and three Justices to the Supreme Court respectively while President 
Carter made no such appointments. Thus, the factors which impact on 
the judiciary's orientation at any given point in time include the mood 
of the country as reflected by the President it elects, the number of 
vacancies that accrue during a President's term, the President's personal 
philosophy regarding judicial appointments, and whether there has been 
a trend toward electing liberal or conservative presidents and, if so, how 
long that trend has continued. While it is arguable that these variables 
account for the judiciary's historical resistance to the temporal whims of 
the electorate, such resistance is not attributable to these factors alone. 
Respect for the doctrine of stare decisis, fidelity to one's oath of office, 
and personal biases are all no doubt contributing factors. Respect for 
the stare decisis doctrine has been an especially critical factor because 
it constitutes the backbone of the legitimacy of judicial review in the 
eyes of the American electorate. 
98 See generally Denis S Rutkus, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Roles 
of the President, Judiciary Committee, and Senate (Congressional Research 
Service, 2010). 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
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Though there is a general consensus among the American electorate 
that politics plays a role in constitutional-decision making, there is also 
an endemic belief that the judiciary is generally comprised of men and 
women of integrity who maintain an abiding reverence for established 
legal principles. Indeed, one should not underestimate the importance 
of this perception in the American constitutional scheme. Though many 
consider the judiciary to be a co-equal branch of the federal government, 
the fact remains that without the aid of the executive branch, it is 
powerless to enforce its decisions. As former President Andrew Jackson 
is claimed to have remarked, 'The Chief Justice has made his decision. 
Now let's see him enforce it' .102 Though President Jackson's approach 
has never been put to the test, many attribute this to the American 
electorate's acceptance of the legitimacy of judicial review. Were such 
acceptance lacking, an executive's refusal to enforce the judiciary's 
decisions would entail fewer political risks and, consequently, the 
potential for a major constitutional crisis would increase dramatically. 
Apparently cognisant of the fact that their power ultimately depends 
on maintaining the respect and good will of the American people, the 
judiciary has typically accorded a high respect to the doctrine of stare 
decisis. Were the judiciary to overrule constitutional precedents on a 
massive scale, it is possible, if not likely, that the American electorate's 
view of the legitimacy of judicial review would be greatly undermined 
as it came to view the judiciary as just another highly politicised 
branch of government. 
There is every reason to believe that respect for the doctrine of stare 
decisis, fidelity to one's oath of office, and personal biases would 
similarly affect judges in Australia or any other modem democratic 
society. In any event, there is little question that minorities in the 
United States have benefited from the protection of an entrenched Bill 
of Rights, and the same result would surely follow in Australia. 
This point is amplified by the fact that there is nothing to prevent the state 
and federal governments from affording protections that exceed those 
which are required by an entrenched Bill of Rights in the Australian 
Constitution. Thus, if the judiciary'S interpretation of a constitutional 
protection is more grudging than that of the electorate, the will of the 
electorate prevails. Similarly, if the electorate is disposed to afford less 
102 Although this quotation is popularly attributed to the then President Andrew 
Jackson, it has also been rejected by other sources: Paul F Boller and John 
H George, They Never Said It: A Book a/False Quotes, Misquotes, & False 
Attributions (Oxford University Press, 1990) 53 
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protection than the Constitution requires, the Constitution prevails. 
In the unlikely event that the ~udiciary's interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights were to mirror the will of an electorate bent on the evisceration 
of minority rights across the board, minorities would still fare no worse 
than ifthere were no entrenched Bill of Rights. 
IX CONCLUSION 
The foregoing was not intended to suggest that the abuse of minorities 
is commonplace in Australia. On the contrary, Australia can boast 
one of the finest records on human rights in the modem industrialised 
world. Its comprehensive laws prohibiting most forms of racial and 
sexual discrimination, for example, are most commendable and no 
doubt reflect the conscience and decency of the Australian people. 
Yet the fact that abuses of minorities occur less often than in most 
countries is not necessarily cause for celebration. Where human rights 
are concerned, any protection short of the best that can be achieved 
is simply unacceptable. History serves as a sobering reminder that no 
matter how modem, well-informed, or enlightened a society may be, 
there are certain risks inherent in the notion of majoritarian rule: most 
notably the risk that the rights of minorities will be accorded less than 
their proper respect. The Australian, British, German and American 
experiences, inter alia, are replete with instances where this risk has 
been transformed into an ugly reality. 
The foregoing discussion has sought to demonstrate that protecting 
minorities from this type of abuse is a legitimate objective which can 
only be adequately achieved through an entrenched Bill of Rights 
supported by the power of judicial review. Without the aid of such anti-
majoritarian devices, the protection of minorities is made to depend 
on the willingness of elected representatives to flout the tenets of 
majoritarian rule when the legitimate need arises. As experience has 
demonstrated, elected officials are often prone to follow the path of 
political expedience rather than the path of conscience and basic human 
decency. Given this reality, neither Dicey's idealistic expression of the 
Rule of Law, nor any other formulation can adequately ensure protection 
for the rights of minorities under a system in which Parliament is 
supreme and the government is supported by a majority in the 
House of Representatives. 
This is not to suggest that an entrenched Bill of Rights is an infallible 
device for protecting human rights. To be effective, a Bill of Rights 
must be couched in terms that are spacious enough to allow for 
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adaptation and development as times change and new and difficult 
pn~blems arise. The dangers that inhere in a supreme law consisting 
of broad and adaptable principles are as immense as they are obvious. 
There is little question that entrusting an independent and non-elected 
judiciary with the responsibility of construing these principles has and 
will continue to result in abuses. It therefore becomes the responsibility 
of the electorate, acting through their elected representatives, to devise 
some effective means of confining such abuses within acceptable limits. 
The fact remains, however, that it is impractical to expect that a perfect 
balance between judicial independence and accountability can ever be 
achieved. What is practical is to accept the notion that although some 
judicial abuses are inevitable, they are an acceptable price to pay for the 
protection of principles that society regards as basic human rights. 
Given this position, it is regrettable that in a governmental review into 
the protection of human rights and freedoms in Australia, the idea of an 
entrenched Bill of Rights was excluded from consideration. This author 
urges the government to return this matter to the agenda in its 2014 
review of Australia's Human Rights Framework. 
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